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Abstract Using a hedonic pricing model, we analyze the capitalization of
total seller paid discount points and closing costs into the price
of a house. We hypothesize that sellers are concerned about the
sales price net of total seller paid concessions (SPNC), rather
than the exact terms of the transaction. Since the SPNC is easily
ascertained in the negotiation process, we further hypothesize
that total seller paid concessions (TSPC) are fully capitalized into
the sales price. To test this hypothesis, sales price is regressed
on a set of control variables including TSPC. In this framework,
TSPC will be positive and not signiﬁcantly different from one if
concessions are fully capitalized. The empirical results provide
support for the capitalization hypothesis. Negotiation strategies
and study limitations follow from the empirical results.
Introduction
The real estate literature contains numerous studies that examine the sales price
of residential property. Over the last two decades, researchers have rigorously
investigated the impact of creative ﬁnancing techniques on contract price. Creative
ﬁnancing is a generic term that includes, but is not limited to, issues such as
mortgage buydowns, below market interest rates, mortgage assumptions, seller
paid discount points and seller paid closing costs. The majority of the prior
research examines the ﬁrst three issues. Representative studies in this area of
research include Bible and Crunkelton (1983), Sirmans, Smith and Sirmans
(1983), Clauretie (1984), Rosen (1984), Smith, Sirmans and Sirmans (1984),
Sirmans, Sirmans and Smith (1985), Sunderman, Cannaday and Colwell (1990)
and Black (1995).
Some, but not all, issues relating to discount points and/or closing costs have been
addressed in the real estate literature. For example, Zerbst and Brueggemnan
(1977), Gunterman (1979), Smith and Sirmans (1984) and Colwell, Guntermann
and Sirmans (1979) examine the impact of concessions on non-conventional
ﬁnancing. In general, these studies ﬁnd that creative ﬁnancing is capitalized into
the ﬁnal sales price but less than fully. Hence, there is economic signiﬁcance in288  Johnson, Anderson and Webb
negotiating the sales price as well as other terms of the transaction. Other studies
examine discount point\interest rate tradeoff strategies in the mortgage decision
process. Follain (1990) has provided research in this area along with Dunn and
Spatt (1988) and Cannaday and Yang (1995).
Recently, research analyzing the capitalization of discount points and closing costs
has reignited. Black and Nourse (1995) examine whether a buyer’s broker could
reduce the closing costs that are usually paid by the buyer. They ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant evidence that a buyer’s broker can reduce these costs. Asabere and
Huffman (1997) directly address the capitalization of seller paid discount points
and closing costs. They hypothesize that seller paid concessions in the form of
discount points and closing costs will be signiﬁcantly capitalized into the ﬁnal
selling price for affordability and ‘‘out of pocket’’ expense reasons, respectively.
Using a hedonic pricing framework, the authors ﬁnd that discount points are
capitalized into the selling price,1 but closing costs are not. Imperfect capitalization
implies that the structure (price and other terms) of a contract is signiﬁcant and
should impact the negotiation process. For example, a seller would be
economically worse off by paying closing costs and/or points if he/she is unable
to recover these concessions in the form of a price premium at closing.
The results of the Asabere and Huffman paper are intuitively unappealing as the
seller can easily ascertain the impact of his/her concessions on their ﬁnal
proceeds. Utilizing multiple approaches and a different data set, this study
reexamines the capitalization of seller paid discount points and closing costs. The
article provides the theoretical framework from the buyer’s and seller’s respective
points of view. The study then presents the methodology and data, analyzes the
empirical results and presents the conclusions.
 Theoretical Framework
Seller Concessions from the Buyer’s Vantage Point
In the simplest sense, a buyer may ask for seller concessions of discount points
and/or closing costs to overcome some ﬁnancial shortcoming. With respect to
discount points, the seller is subsidizing the buyer’s debt service payment. In
effect, the seller makes the house more affordable to the buyer on a monthly
payment basis and reduces the buyer’s ‘‘out of pocket’’ expenses at closing in the
process. In essence, additional demand is created for the property as more potential
buyers can theoretically afford to purchase the house.
Closing costs, on the other hand, will not reduce the potential buyer’s debt service.
In fact, if a premium is demanded for the concessions, the buyer’s debt service
may increase. What closing cost concessions do is reduce the buyer’s ‘‘out of
pocket’’ expense at closing. Again, this could create additional demand for the
property, as more people will have the funds necessary to close. This type ofThe Capitalization of Seller Paid Concessions  289
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ﬁnancing is common for buyers with relatively large incomes but limited cash or
marketable securities.
Finally, it may be that certain buyers believe that they can economically enhance
themselves by negotiating on more factors than price. This would be true if seller
concessions are not fully reﬂected in the form of a price premium.
Concessions from the Seller’s Vantage Point
This study, as does Asabere and Huffman (1997), expects that a seller would
require an increase in price to offset any concessions provided at closing. With
respect to discount points, it is assumed that a seller would be willing to concede
points to facilitate a sale, as long as the payment is recovered as a price premium
at closing. Similarly, a seller would offer to pay substantial closing costs in the
negotiation process if they could recapture these outlays via capitalization. To this
point, our theoretical framework coincides with that of Asabere and Huffman.
However, due to tax incentives and debt service issues, Asabere and Huffman
hypothesize that discount points are more likely to be fully capitalized into the
sales price as a premium. Certainly, there are tax implications with respect to the
ﬁnal construction of the closing. However, we assume that a buyer as well a seller
is primarily concerned with the pretax implications of a closing. While this
assumption may not hold for the astute buyer or seller, it is a reasonable
assumption for the average buyer and seller.
Framework for Seller Concession Capitalization
In the negotiation process, a seller is easily able to ascertain the sales price net
of total seller paid concessions (SPNC). A simple example will illustrate this point.
A seller, with utility function and ﬁnancial constraints, determines ex ante the
minimum SPNC that is acceptable. Any offers that do not meet the seller’s
minimum SPNC would be rejected. We hypothesize that any offer that meets the
seller’s minimum SPNC would be accepted regardless of its’structure with respect
to concessions.2 For example, if a seller’s reservation SPNC is $100,000 and a
buyer offers $100,000 as the sales price, but requests positive seller concessions,
the offer will be rejected. However, if the buyer increases the offer by the
magnitude of the concessions, the seller will accept the offer, as the seller will
receive the amount of proceeds necessary given his/her utility function and
ﬁnancial constraints. Certainly, a seller would accept all offers where the SPNC
exceeds the minimum reservation SPNC. Furthermore, we recognize the
possibility that a buyer could begin by offering something less than the seller’s
minimum SPNC. However, given the seller’s ex ante ability to set the reservation
SPNC, a legally binding contract will only be formed if this minimum is obtained.
If the above is true, both seller paid discount points and closing costs will be fully
reﬂected in the sales price because the seller is indifferent to the structural form290  Johnson, Anderson and Webb
of the contract and is only concerned with his/her SPNC.3 Hence, a seller can
establish a contract sales price given his/her acceptable SPNC and the concessions
requested by a buyer. A buyer may still desire to negotiate for seller concessions,
due to individual circumstances, but should expect to pay for the concessions in
the form of a price premium.
 Methodology and Data
The Model(s )
In order to test our capitalization hypothesis, we ﬁrst regress sales price (SP)o n
a set of control variables commonly used in hedonic pricing models, including a
separate control for total seller paid concessions (TSPC). Where TSPC is deﬁned
as the sum of total seller paid closing costs and discount points.4 If our
capitalization hypothesis is correct, TSPC will be positive with a coefﬁcient not
statistically different from one, indicating concessions are fully capitalized into
the contract sales price. A base model, hereafter referred to as Model 1, is
expressed as:
SP     AGE   SQFT   BED   BATH 01 2 3 4
  LEE   LANIER   CARVER   COUNTY 56 7 8
  GAR   CPT   POOL   FP   GB 91 01 1 1 2 1 3
  NC   TSPC  . (1) 14 15 i
Here, SP represents the contract sales price. The variables AGE, SQFT, BED and
BATH serve as continuous predictors and represent the property’s age, square
footage, number of bedrooms and number of baths, respectively.
Five high school zones serve as location proxies. We place four dummy variables
in the model: LEE, LANIER, CARVER and COUNTY, which are equal to one if
the property is located in the Lee, Lanier, Carver and County high school zones,
respectively. They are zero otherwise. The base dummy variable is Jefferson Davis
(JD) and is reﬂected in the constant term. In addition, three types of parking are
speciﬁed for the model: driveway only, carport and garage. Two dummy variables
are placed in the model, GAR (representing garage) and CPT (representing
carport), which take on values of one if the property has a garage or carport,
respectively. Otherwise they are zero. Again, the base dummy variable driveway
only (DRIVE) is captured by the intercept.
Control variables are also speciﬁed for the presence of a pool (POOL), ﬁreplace
(FP), garden bath (GB) and whether or not the property is newly constructed orThe Capitalization of Seller Paid Concessions  291
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existing (NC). NC is speciﬁed to control for the possible segmentation in the
market between existing and new properties. The professional negotiating skills
of builders might exceed those of existing property owners. Along the same line,
the demand for new construction might be such that it would place a premium on
newly constructed properties. In either case, a control for new construction is
warranted.
As speciﬁed in Model 1, the independent variable TSPC should be positive and
signiﬁcant with a coefﬁcient of one, if concessions are fully capitalized into the
contract sales price. We formally test whether the estimated coefﬁcient is equal
to one in two ways. Initially, we simply construct a 95% conﬁdence interval on
TSPC and ascertain if one is contained within the interval. Subsequently, we
directly test the null hypothesis that 15 is equal to one verses the alternative
hypothesis that 15 is different from one. To do this, we estimate a reduced model
that subtracts TSPC (technically 1*TSPC) from SP and removes TSPC from the
right hand side of Model 1. The reduced model is speciﬁed as:
(SP  1*TSPC)     AGE   SQFT   BED 01 2 3
  BATH   LEE   LANIER 45 6
  CARVER   COUNTY   GAR 78 9
  CPT   POOL   FP 10 11 12
  GB   NC  . (2) 13 14 i
Essentially, if the coefﬁcient equals one, the ratio of the sum of squares error for
Models 1 and 2 will not be statistically different. Formally, the following F-test
is used to test if 15 is signiﬁcantly different from one and thereby serve as another
test of the capitalization hypothesis:
SSE (2)  SSE (1) SSE (1)
F*  .
dƒ (2)  dƒ (1) dƒ (1)
The degrees of freedom (dƒ) above are associated with the sum of square errors
(SSE) of the respective models. Finding an insigniﬁcant F*-Statistic is indicative
of full capitalization. That is to say, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 15
is equal to one.
An alternative way to explore capitalization is to alter Model 1 by changing the
dependent variable to sales price less total seller paid concessions (SPNC)a s
shown next:292  Johnson, Anderson and Webb
SPNC     AGE   SQFT   BED   BATH 01 2 3 4
  LEE   LANIER   CARVER   COUNTY 56 7 8
  GAR   CPT   POOL   FP 91 01 1 1 2
  GB   NC   TSPC  . 13 14 15 i (3)
All of the independent variables are deﬁned as in Model 1. In this speciﬁcation,
TSPC will be statistically insigniﬁcant if concessions are capitalized. However,
ﬁnding an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on TSPC is a necessary but not sufﬁcient
condition for capitalization. If TSPC is insigniﬁcant in Model 1, it could prove to
be insigniﬁcant in Model 3. Hence, if Model 3 is estimated in isolation, a false
positive result supporting capitalization could be obtained. As such, Model 3
serves as a check of our capitalization hypothesis, but the prior estimations are
necessary.
The Data
The initial data set consists of all residential real estate conventional loan closings
(2,716) that occurred during the calendar year 1998 in Montgomery, Alabama.
The data is provided via two primary sources. The Multiple Listing Service (MLS)
of the Montgomery Area Association of Realtors provides all of the data except
for property age and square footage measurements. These measurements are
provided by the Montgomery County Tax Assessor’s ofﬁce.
In obtaining the ﬁnal data set, we ﬁrst eliminate observations that do not have
data on age and square footage. In addition, data entry errors from the MLS such
as seller concessions that exceed conventional lender’s underwriting guidelines,
negative days on market, negative bedrooms or baths, etc., are eliminated leaving
1,556 observations. An examination of the raw data (1556 observations) reveals
that the majority of transactions involving zero seller paid concessions occurred
for properties selling in excess of $100,000. This ﬁnding is consistent with our
concessions framework, which suggest that relatively ‘‘cash poor’’ buyers are
likely to request concessions. Moreover, seller concessions for houses greater than
$100,000 represent approximately 1% of the total contract sales price. Hence, for
these houses, the impact of seller paid concessions would be swamped by the
variability in total sales price.5 Given these considerations, we only include
properties that sold for less than $100,000 to test our capitalization hypothesis
leaving a total of 778 observations.6 Due to the nature of our data, we cannot
make any statements regarding capitalization over all price ranges. Descriptive
statistics for the ﬁnal sample are contained in Exhibit 1.The Capitalization of Seller Paid Concessions  293
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Exhibit 1  Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
SP ($) 78,387.85 79,900.00 13,955.47
AGE 25.21 23.00 18.17
SQFT 1,628.26 1,541.50 430.19
BED 3.03 3 0.48
BATH 1.96 2 0.39
LEE 0.43 0 0.49
JD 0.34 0 0.47
LANIER 0.19 0 0.39
CARVER 0.02 0 0.15
COUNTY 0.02 0 0.11
GAR 0.11 0 0.32
CPT 0.20 0 0.39
DRIVE 0.69 1 0.46
POOL 0.06 0 0.23
FP 0.63 1 0.48
GB 0.18 0 0.38
NC 0.03 0 0.17
TSPC ($) 2,057.89 2,476.00 1,228.26
SP  Contract sales price
AGE  Age of the property
SQFT  Square footage
BED  Number of bedrooms
BATH  Number of baths
LEE  One if in Lee school zone, zero otherwise
JD  One if in Jefferson Davis school zone, zero otherwise
LANIER  One if in Lanier school zone, zero otherwise
CARVER  One if in Carver school zone, zero otherwise
COUNTY  One if in County school zone, zero otherwise
GAR  One if property has a garage, zero otherwise
CPT  One if the property has a carport, zero otherwise
DRIVE  One if the property has a driveway only, zero otherwise
POOL  One if the property has a pool, zero otherwise
FP  One if the property has a ﬁreplace, zero otherwise
GB  One if the property has a garden bath, zero otherwise
NC  One if the house is newly constructed, zero otherwise
TSPC  Total seller paid concessions, which is the sum of seller paid discount points and closing costs294  Johnson, Anderson and Webb
 Empirical Results
The empirical results for Model 1 are contained in Exhibit 2, Panel A. The model
is highly signiﬁcant with an overall F-Statistic of 37.35 (p-value  .000) and a
R2 of 42.4%. The general hedonic modeling assumptions of normality and
common variance were veriﬁed by way of examining the speciﬁed model’s normal
probability plot and scatter plots of the residuals versus predicted values. None of
the plots suggest signiﬁcant deviations from the assumptions of the general linear
model.7
Problems with multicollinearity are always a concern in hedonic pricing research
utilizing multiple regression techniques. Accordingly, the regression coefﬁcients
of Model 1 were compared to the correlation matrix. This examination revealed
no multicollinearity concerns. Formally, the variance inﬂation factors (VIF) were
computed and reported in Exhibit 2, Panel A. VIF values in excess of 10 indicate
that multicollinearity may be unduly inﬂuencing least squares estimates. In Model
1, as well as in the other models, none of the factors are near this upper bound
rule of thumb (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1989).
In examining the control variables (excluding for the moment the critical factor
of total seller paid concessions), the results show that several variables are
signiﬁcant and display their expected sign. In particular, for the continuous
predictors, total square footage, number of bedrooms and baths are signiﬁcant and
positively related to SP, as expected. The continuous predictor age is negative and
signiﬁcant, as expected.
Next, considering the dichotomous variables controlling for the presence of a
ﬁreplace, garden tub and pool, the coefﬁcients are all positive and signiﬁcantly
related to SP, as expected. The base case for parking type (driveway only), being
the least desirable of the parking options, indicates the coefﬁcients for garage and
carports should be positive with garage having the larger magnitude due its
preference over carports. We ﬁnd this result; however, the coefﬁcient on carports
is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Additionally, each of the dichotomous variables representing school zones are
negative and signiﬁcantly (excluding COUNTY) related to SP as expected, due to
general preference for houses located in the Jefferson Davis school zone. Finally,
NC is insigniﬁcant in the model. Earlier we hypothesized that the natural market
segmentation between existing and newly constructed properties warranted a
control for new construction. The empirical results suggest that neither builders
negotiating skills nor excess demand for new construction signiﬁcantly impact SP.
Turning to the critical factor of this study, TSPC, the variable’s coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant in Model 1 with a coefﬁcient .921 (p-value  .004). To test our
capitalization hypothesis, we need to determine if the coefﬁcient is equal to one.
As noted, we test this by ﬁrst constructing a conﬁdence interval on the coefﬁcient.
The 95% conﬁdence interval is (.298, 2.14) indicating that one is contained withinThe Capitalization of Seller Paid Concessions  295
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Exhibit 2  Regression Analysis
Coef. Std. Dev. tp VIF
Panel A: Predictor
Constant 43,262 3,463 12.49 0
AGE 59.65 24.13 2.47 0.014 1.3
SQFT 4.61 0.93 4.96 0 1.1
BED 4,733.1 824.3 5.74 0 1.1
BATH 4,848 1,067 4.55 0 1.2
LEE 2,686 904.8 2.97 0.003 1.4
LANIER 8,813 1,162 7.58 0 1.4
CARVER 11,962 2,595 4.61 0 1.1
COUNTY 4,279 3,473 1.23 0.218 1
GAR 3,300 1,274 2.59 0.01 1.1
CPT 135 1,037 0.13 0.896 1.2
POOL 4,278 1,674 2.56 0.011 1
FP 6,579.4 868.3 7.58 0 1.2
GB 9,829 1,119 8.78 0 1.3
NC 1,203 2,332 0.52 0.606 1.1
TSPC 0.92 0.32 2.90 0.004 1
R2 .424
Overall F-Stat 37.35 .000
SSE 8.7210
df-error 762
Panel B: Model 2
Constant 43,060 3,364 12.8 0
AGE 59.46 24.11 2.47 0.014 1.3
SQFT 4.61 0.93 4.96 0 1.1
BED 4,734.7 823.7 5.75 0 1.1
BATH 4,862 1,065 4.57 0 1.2
LEE 2,693.6 903.7 2.98 0.003 1.4
LANIER 8,798 1,160 7.58 0 1.4
CARVER 11,931 2,591 4.61 0 1.1
COUNTY 4,271 3,471 1.23 0.219 1.0
GAR 3,311 1,272 2.60 0.009 1.1
CPT 152 1,034 0.15 0.883 1.1
POOL 4,259 1,671 2.55 0.011 1.0296  Johnson, Anderson and Webb
Exhibit 2  (continued)
Regression Analysis
Coef. Std. Dev. tp VIF
Panel B: Model 2
FP 6,577.6 867.8 7.58 0 1.2
GB 9,830 1,119 8.79 0 1.3
NC 1,270 2,315 0.55 0.584 1.1
R2 .418
Overall F-Stat 39.14 .000
SSE 8.72  10
df-error 763
Note: The dependent variable  sales price.
the interval. Secondly, we utilize a reduced model (Model 2) and directly test the
null hypothesis that 15 is equal to one verses the alternative hypothesis that 15
is different from one. The regressions results from the reduced model are
contained in Exhibit 2, Panel B. From Exhibit 2, the F*-Statistic can be
constructed and has a value of .061, which is insigniﬁcant, indicating we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that 15 is equal to one. Both of these tests indicate that
the coefﬁcient on total seller paid concessions in Model 1 is not statistically
different from one, indicating capitalization of concessions into sales price for our
sample set as hypothesized.
As a ﬁnal check of our capitalization hypothesis, we investigate the necessary
condition suggested in Model 3 in Methodology and Data. We regress sales price
less total seller paid concessions (SPNC) on the property characteristics as deﬁned
in Model 3 (see Exhibit 3). Again, the coefﬁcients exhibit signs and signiﬁcance
similar to those of prior speciﬁcations in this work. Most importantly, the
coefﬁcient of TSPC is insigniﬁcant as expected in our framework indicating
capitalization.8
Thus, the cumulative empirical evidence using our sample suggests to the extent
that seller paid concessions are present in the negotiation process that it is
reasonable to assume that buyers pay for concessions in the form of price
premiums. A normative negotiation strategy follows from this result for buyers.
Since the buyer effectively pays for these seller granted concessions, the buyer
should not be misled into believing that simply shifting these costs to the seller
in contractual terms will relieve them from paying these expenses.9The Capitalization of Seller Paid Concessions  297
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Exhibit 3  Regression Analysis
Predictor Coef. Std. Dev. tp VIF
Constant 43,262 3,463 12.49 0
AGE 59.65 24.13 2.47 0.014 1.3
SQFT 4.61 0.93 4.96 0 1.1
BED 4,733.1 824.3 5.74 0 1.1
BATH 4,848 1,067 4.55 0 1.2
LEE 2,686 904.8 2.97 0.003 1.4
LANIER 8,813 1,162 7.58 0 1.4
CARVER 11,962 2,595 4.61 0 1.1
COUNTY 4,279 3,473 1.23 0.218 1
GAR 3,300 1,274 2.59 0.01 1.1
CPT 135 1,037 0.13 0.896 1.2
POOL 4,278 1,674 2.56 0.011 1
FP 6,579.4 868.3 7.58 0 1.2
GB 9,829 1,119 8.78 0 1.3
NC 1,203 2,332 0.52 0.606 1.1
TSPC 0.08 0.32 0.25 0.80 1
R2 .418
F-Stat 36.49 .000
Note: Dependent variable  sales price net of total seller paid concessions.
 Conclusion
In this study, linear hedonic analysis is applied to a data set of residential real
estate closings that occurred in Montgomery, Alabama in 1998. This study
analyzes the capitalization of seller concessions. Speciﬁcally, we regress the sales
price on a set of predictor variables including our variable of interest, total seller
paid concessions (TSPC).
We ﬁnd strong support for our hypothesis that total seller paid concessions are
capitalized into the contract sales price. As such, a buyer requesting seller
concessions will be forced to pay for these costs in the form of a higher contract
price. In other words, since the buyer pays for these costs, they should understand
that negotiating for the seller to pay concessions will not allow them to escape
these fees.
Real estate professionals have long understood this point. They understand that
buyers negotiate on their total investment in a property. Whereas, sellers, being298  Johnson, Anderson and Webb
able to ex ante establish their reservation SPNC and thereby a contract sales price,
negotiate on their acceptable level of SPNC. Thus, the task for the real estate
broker becomes that of establishing the seller’s reservation SPNC and adjusting
the contract sales price for the concessions necessary to the buyer.
 Endnotes
1 When controlling for ﬁnancing type, Asabere and Huffman (1997) ﬁnd that discount
points are not capitalized into the contract price for nonconventional ﬁnancing.
2 It may be possible that the equity position of a seller alters the minimum acceptable
SPNC. Unfortunately, the data provided does not contain any information about the
mortgage balances and/or the equity positions of the sellers.
3 Since market conditions can impact sales price, it is important to note that in 1998 the
National Association of REALTORS reported an upward trend in the national housing
markets with respect to both new and existing properties. In fact, existing house sales
reached an all time annualized high while existing inventories hit an all time low. New
house starts also approached all time highs (NAR, 1999). In our framework, however,
market conditions should have little impact on the shifting of costs. We implicitly assume
that in a strong sellers’market, the SPNC increases accordingly. In other words, the seller
requires a relatively high SPNC. In a buyer’s market, we implicitly assume that the seller
sets the SPNC lower. Again, it would not matter what form the offer came in (i.e., the
contract structure) as long as the seller attains the desired SPNC. Hence, in our model,
market conditions alter what offer(s) the seller is willing to accept.
4 Some of the prior research in this area speciﬁed models that control separately for
discount points and closing costs paid by the seller. However, during the timeframe of
our data, as well as presently, the use of discount points (seller paid or otherwise) is very
limited. Given the limited use of discount points, the impact of a separate variable for
discount points would be swamped by the large variation in house prices in the sample
set. Hence, we combine both types of seller paid concessions into a single variable, which
is theoretically consistent with our capitalization framework.
5 In addition, in sales price—SC/SP (seller concessions/sales price) space, lowess point
ﬁtting technology suggests that the occurrence of concessions as a percentage of price
drops off dramatically above $100,000.
6 We also parsed the data by including all houses with sales price less than the mean and
sales price less than the median. The results were robust across all samples. As such, the
remainder of the article only discusses the sample of houses with sales price less than
$100,000.
7 Slight evidence of unequal error variance, suggests a transformation of the dependent
variable sales price might be warranted. Accordingly, we transform sales price to the
natural log of sales price as done in prior work. In this speciﬁcation, all of the predictor
variables are as deﬁned in Model 1. All of the results are consistent across models,
providing support for our hypothesis.
8 In addition, estimates of Model 3 were conducted employing the natural log of SPNC
(to combat the possibility of unequal variance), the results were robust with respect to
our capitalization hypothesis.The Capitalization of Seller Paid Concessions  299
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9 Again, care should be taken in interpreting the results. We cannot make any statements
for capitalization for relatively high-priced properties.
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